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Cultural property is a unique form of property. It may be at once personal
property and real property; it is non-fungible; it carries deep historical value; it
educates; it is part tangible, part transient.' Cultural property is property that
has acquired a special social status inextricably linked to a certain group's
identity. Its value to the group is unconnected to how outsiders might assess its
2
economic worth. If, as Hegel posited, property is an extension of personhood,
then cultural property, for some, is an extension of nationhood.
Perhaps because of that unique status, specialized rules have developed,
both domestically and internationally, to resolve some of the legal ambiguities
inherent in "owning" cultural property. The United States, for example, has
passed numerous laws protecting cultural property4 and has joined treaties and
participated in international conventions affirming cultural property's special
legal status.5 Those rules focus primarily on conflict prevention and rely upon
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1. The United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)
Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of
Ownership of Cultural Property (1970 UNESCO Convention) defines cultural property as "property
which, on religious or secular grounds, is specifically designated by each State as being of importance
for archaeology, prehistory, history, literature, art or science." 1970 UNESCO Convention art. 1, Nov.
14, 1970, 96 Stat. 2350, 823 U.N.T.S. 231. The property must also belong to a specific "category" of
cultural property as specified by the Convention. Id.
2. Patty Gerstenblith, Identity and Cultural Property: The Protection of Cultural Property in
the United States, 75 B.U. L. REv. 559, 569-70 (1995).
3. Civil society can be understood as a community of possession, with each individual
owning property as the embodiment of spirit. G.W.F. HEGEL, ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT
77-81 (Allen W. Wood ed., H.B. Nisbet trans., 1991); see also Margaret Jane Radin, Property and
Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REv. 957, 959 (1982) (arguing that certain property is "part of the way we
constitute ourselves as continuing personal entities in the world").
4. See, e.g., Antiquities Act of 1906, 16 U.S.C. §§ 431-433 (2006); Historic Sites Act of
1935, 16 U.S.C. §§ 461-467 (2006); Reservoir Salvage Act of 1960, 16 U.S.C. § 469 (2006);
Archeological Resources Protection Act of 1979, 16 U.S.C. §§ 470aa-mm (2006); Convention on
Cultural Property Implementation Act, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2613 (2006); Arts and Artifacts Indemnity
Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 971-976 (2006); Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act, 25 U.S.C.
§§ 3001-3013 (2006).
5. See UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects, June 24,
1995, 34 I.L.M. 1330 [hereinafter UNIDROIT Convention]; UNESCO Convention for the Protection of
the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, Nov. 16, 1972, 27 U.S.T. 37, 1037 U.N.T.S. 151; 1970
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strong protections to preempt cultural property disputes. But specialized
cultural property laws, in the United States and elsewhere, pay scant attention
to the issues that arise when prevention fails. Specifically, those laws neglect to
provide adequate guidelines for cultural property litigation and enforcement.
That legal lacuna underlies the recent developments in the cultural
property case Agudas Chasidei Chabad v. Russian Federation, more commonly
known as Chabad v. Russia. This Comment addresses the problem of
enforcement in international cultural property law, as manifested in Chabad v.
Russia. The Chabad organization7 brought litigation against Russia in U.S.
federal court to recover the Schneerson Collection, held at the Russian State
Library. The Collection consists of sacred Jewish texts on Chabad Chassidic
8tradition amassed by successive generations of Rebbes beginning in 1772. The
Collection has two components: the "Library,"9  nationalized during the
Bolshevik Revolution,' 0 and the "Archive,"" plundered during the Second
World War.12 The Collection, then, is simultaneously a part of Russian
UNESCO Convention, supra note 1; Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of
Armed Conflict, May 14, 1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 240. The United States did not join the 1970 UNESCO
Convention until 1983, upon passing the Convention on Cultural Property Implementation Act, 19
U.S.C. §§ 2601-2613.
6. Agudas Chasidei Chabad v. Russ. Fed'n, 528 F.3d 934 (D.C. Cir. 2008), affing in part,
rev'ing in part 466 F. Supp. 2d 6 (D.D.C. 2006).
7. Agudas Chasidei Chabad of the United States ("Chabad") is the umbrella organization for
Chabad-Lubavitch, a Chasidic movement within Orthodox Judaism. Headquartered in Brooklyn, New
York, it is one of the largest Chasidic organizations in the world. See AVRUM M. EHRLICH, LEADERSHIP
IN THE HABAD MOVEMENT (2000); SUE FISHKOFF, THE REBBE'S ARMY: INSIDE THE WORLD OF
CHABAD-LUBAVITCH (2003); see also HARRY M. RABINOWICZ, HASIDISM: THE MOVEMENT AND ITS
MASTERS (1998) (describing the history of Chasidism); CHABAD LUBAVITCH HEADQUARTERS,
http://lubavitch.com/ (last visited Mar. 13, 2012).
8. Chabad, 466 F. Supp. 2d at 11-12. The Collection is "the textual source for . . . religious
teachings." Brief of Appellee at 7, Chabad, 528 F.3d 934 (Consol. Case Nos. 07-7002 & 07-7006). A
"Rebbe" is a rabbi whom the community recognizes for exceptional spiritual qualities. Chabad, 528
F.3d at 938.
9. The Library contains more than 12,000 books and 381 manuscripts. Chabad, 466 F. Supp.
2d at 11-12.
10. In 1915, as the German army advanced into Russia during the First World War, the fifth
Rebbe fled Russia and sent the Library for storage to a book depository in Moscow. Just two years later,
after the owner of the storage facility died, the books were nationalized as the Bolsheviks seized the
library during the Russian Revolution. See Chabad, 466 F. Supp. 2d at 11; Michael J. Bazyler & Seth M.
Gerber, Litigating the Pillage of Cultural Property in American Courts: Chabad v. Russian Federation
and Lessons Learned, 32 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 45, 49-50 (2010) (describing the history and
circumstances of the nationalization). See generally STEPHEN F. WILLIAMS, LIBERAL REFORM IN AN
ILLIBERAL REGIME: THE CREATION OF PRIVATE PROPERTY IN RUSSIA, 1906-1915, at 147-79 (2006)
(detailing the complexity and scale of Russia's in property rights reform during this period).
11. The Archive contains more than 25,000 handwritten pages of Chabad Rebbes' teachings,
correspondence, and other documents. Chabad, 466 F. Supp. 2d at 12.
12. With the Library lost to the Soviets, the sixth Rebbe, Rabbi Joel Itzkha Schneerson, began
accumulating materials for a replacement-the Archive. As the hostilities mounted and the Nazis began
aggressively targeting Jews in Poland, the sixth Rebbe was able to escape Poland with some assistance
and arrived in New York on March 19, 1940, but had to leave the Archive behind. See Bazyler &
Gerber, supra note 10, at 51; see also BRYAN MARK RIGG, RESCUED FROM THE REICH: How ONE OF
HITLER'S SOLDIERS SAVED THE LUBAVITCHER REBBE 122-29 (2004) (describing how the sixth Rebbe
was able to escape from Poland while being hunted by Nazis). At an unknown point during the war,
Nazi Germany's armed forces seized the Archive from Poland and transported it to the W61felsdorf
castle in Lower Silesia, then under German control. After the Nazi German surrender, Soviet forces
discovered the plunder in the castle, and it was transported to Moscow. See Bazyler & Gerber, supra
note 10, at 52-55. At that moment, the Archive became a Soviet "Trophy of War," a piece of cultural
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heritage13 and integral to the historical, religious, and ethnic identity of
Chabad.14 After a decades-long diplomatic campaign to recover ownership of
the Collection,' 5 Chabad challenged the legality of those two takings in U.S.
federal court in 2006.16 In July 2010, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
ruled in Chabad's favor.'7
Despite that judgment for Chabad, Russia refused to return the
Collection. Russia's Foreign Ministry deemed the judgment "an unlawful
decision"1 and stipulated that "[t]he Schneerson [Collection] has never
belonged to Chabad."' 9 Most importantly, the Ministry stated, "[t]here is no
agreement between Russia and the U.S. on mutual recognition and enforcement
of civil judgments." 20 Chabad, in fact, had established jurisdiction in the United
States under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA).21 Chabad's
lawyers, in response to Russia's nonperformance, reportedly considered asking
the court to confiscate art in the United States on loan from Russia "as a kind of
heritage that represented victory over the Germans. See PATRICIA KENNEDY GRIMSTED, TROPHIES OF
WAR AND EMPIRE: THE ARCHIVAL HERITAGE OF UKRAINE, WORLD WAR II, AND THE INTERNATIONAL
POLITICS OF RESTITUTION 214, 288-90 (2001). That transformation, from plunder to trophy, will
partially explain why the Russians refuse to perform the decree in Chabad.
13. See infra Section II.C; see also Paul Berger, Russian Art Exchanges Frozen Over Chabad
Lawsuit, JEWISH DAILY FORWARD (Aug. 24, 2011), http://forward.com/articles/141799/russian-art-
exchanges-frozen-over-chabad-lawsuit ("The repatriation of works seized during World War II is a
complex and emotional topic for Russians.. . . Many Russians perceive the spoils as a form of
compensation for the lives lost and hardships incurred. When the newly formed Russian Federation
began repatriating artworks seized by the Nazis during the 1990s, uproar ensued .... Even repatriating
material to Russian institutions has been highly contentious.").
14. The Schneerson Collection and Historical Justice: Hearing Before the Comm'n on Sec. &
Cooperation. in Eur., 109th Cong. 60 (2005) (material submitted for the record by the Russian
Embassy). Passed down from Rebbe to Rebbe, the original manuscripts used by the Rebbes "assume a
sanctity about them," as part of the "essential legacy" of the Chassidic movement. Agudas Chasidei
Chabad v. Russ. Fed'n, 466 F. Supp. 2d 6, 12 (D.D.C. 2006) (quoting testimony from the Gourary
court). "Chabad" itself is an acronym for the Hebrew words chocma, bina, and daas (wisdom,
knowledge, and understanding). Id. at 11. The mission and etymology of Chabad underscore the
importance of the Schneerson Collection as cultural property for the religious movement: The Collection
includes the "Rebbes' handwritten teachings, correspondence, and other records," and other papers that
the organization gathered, archived, and studied beginning in 1772. Id. at 12.
15. Throughout the rest of the twentieth century, Chabad repeatedly declared its ownership of
the Collection and sought its return both through diplomacy and in the Soviet courts. See The
Schneerson Collection and Historical Justice, supra note 14, at 54-56 (statement of Rabbi Yehuda
Krinsky, Former Assistant Chief-of-Staff to the Lubavitcher Rebbe); Bazyler & Gerber, supra note 10,
at 54-64 (describing Chabad's postwar restitution efforts before bringing suit in the United States).
16. Chabad, 466 F. Supp. 2d at 31 ("(G]rant[ing] in part the motion to dismiss as to Chabad's
claims concerning the Library, and.. .deny[ing] in part the motion to dismiss as to Chabad's claims
concerning the Archive." (citations omitted)).
17. Agudas Chasidei Chabad v. Russ. Fed'n, 528 F.3d 934, 939 (D.C. Cir. 2008) ("[W]e
affirm the district court's rejection of Russia's motion to dismiss as to the Archive on act of state
grounds, and we vacate its apparent ruling that the act of state doctrine operates as an alternative ground
for dismissal of Chabad's claims as to the Library."); see also Recent Case, D.C. Circuit Declines To
Apply Act ofState Doctrine to Claim ofRussian Seizure ofReligious Property: Agudas Chasidei Chabad
of United States v. Russian Federation, 122 HARv. L. REv. 1985 (2009).




21. See Chabad, 528 F.3d at 939-50 (finding jurisdiction under the commercial activities
prong of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2)-(3) (2006) (describing
the commercial activity exception to the jurisdictional immunity of a foreign state).
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legal hostage."22 Although U.S. law indemnifies against the loss of or damage
to loaned works, 23 the threat nevertheless spread rapidly until one of Chabad's
attorneys finally intervened, stating that it would not seek to enforce the
judgment through attachment of any indemnified cultural work.24
Such assurance notwithstanding, Russian cultural officials warned the
country's museums that artwork on loan in the United States could be
confiscated. 25 In early 2011, Russian museums canceled existing art loans to
American institutions and issued a lending freeze. The National Gallery of Art
in Washington, the J. Paul Getty Museum, the Los Angeles County Museum of
Art, and the Metropolitan Museum of Art (the Met) were all left with costly
gaps to fill for long-planned exhibitions.26 Despite assurances from many U.S.
government officials,27 Russia's Minister of Culture issued a "verbal force
majeure" in March 2011 to the Museum of Russian Icons in Clinton,
Massachusetts. 2 8 The museum had thirty-seven icons and artifacts on loan for
its "Treasures From Moscow" exhibit,2 9 but Russia sent a curator immediately
to supervise the objects' return.30 In the midst of the revocation from the
Museum of Russian Icons, the Russian Special Presidential Envoy for
International Cultural Cooperation, Mikhail Shvydkoy, stated that the
Schneerson Collection would not be moved from Moscow, and that until the
conflict with Chabad was resolved, there would be no exhibition of Russian
cultural property in the United States.3 1
A sort of cultural cold war began when American museums and
institutions responded in kind to Russia's cancelations. In May 2011, the Met
warned Russian museums that unless and until Russia lifted the ban, the Met
22. Carol Vogel & Clifford J. Levy, Dispute Derails Art Loans from Russia, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
3, 2011, at C1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/03/arts/design/03museum.html.
23. See Arts and Artifacts Indemnity Act, 20 U.S.C. § 971 (2006) (indemnifying against the
loss or damage of art or artifacts and thus facilitating a museum's ability to mount exhibitions with
international artworks); 22 U.S.C. § 2459 (2006) (protecting loaned artwork from seizure).
24. Cristian Salazar & Randy Herschaft, Decades-Long Dispute over Ownership ofHoly Text
Archive Leads Russia To Nix Art Loans, ASSOCIATED PRESS, May 16, 2011, available at
http://www.artdaily.com/section/ lastweek/index.asp?int sec=1 I&int new-47435.
25. See Vogel & Levy, supra note 22.
26. Mike Boehm, LACMA Show Is Collateral Damage in U.S.-Russia Tif L.A. TIMES, May
26, 2011, at AAl; Vogel & Levy, supra note 22. The shows that suffered most from the ban were
"C6zanne's Card Players" and "Room with a View: Open Window in the 19th Century" at the Met, and
"Gauguin: Maker of Myth" and "Venice: Canaletto and His Rivals" at the National Gallery. Paul
Berger, How Chabad Triggered a Superpower Art War, JEWISH CHRON. (Feb. 10, 2011),
http://www.thejc.com/news/world-news/44949/how-chabad-triggered-a-superpower-art-war. The
Houston Museum of Natural Science indefinitely postponed its exhibition, "Treasures from the
Hermitage: Russia's Crown Jewels." Vogel & Levy, supra note 22.
27. See No Reasons To Take Schneerson Library Out of Russia-Shvydkoy, INTERFAX (Mar.
22, 2011), http://www.interfax-religion.com/?act--news&div=8299.
28. Mark Shanahan & Meredith Goldstein, Icons Heading Home, BOS. GLOBE, Mar. 29, 2011,
at 14.
29. Mark Shanahan & Meredith Goldstein, Russian Icons Going Back, Bos. GLOBE, Mar. 18,
2011, at 14.
30. Thomasine Berg, Russia Orders Immediate Return of Artworks from Icon Museum in
Clinton, Bos. GLOBE (Mar. 17, 2011), http://www.boston.com/ae/specials/culturedesk/2011/03/
russia orders immediate retum.html.
31. See No Reasons To Take Schneerson Library Out ofRussia-Shvydkov, supra note 27.
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would not send costumes for a planned touring exhibition.3 2 Other major
lending institutions followed the Met's lead, revealing that they, too, were
considering discontinuing their own loans of cultural property to Russian
museums and other cultural institutions.33 In response to the standoff, the
parties returned to court, and Chabad chastised Russia's behavior in the suit:
"Russia's conduct is an affront to this Court. It's a slap in the face of
international and American law, let alone morality."34 Yet, after another year in
court trying to enforce the judgment, Chabad has temporarily abandoned
litigation and has again engaged Russia in negotiations outside the courtroom.35
Chabad's struggle to enforce the U.S. decree escalated from a legal
dispute to a political and cultural public relations battle between the two
countries. The protracted conflict had a profound impact in the art world as
well as the political world. It resulted in diplomatic tension between the United
States and Russia, inefficiencies in the market for art loans, and, accordingly,
decreased access to cultural property. The post-judgment conflict in Chabad
also exposes a gap in cultural property law 3: an absence of clear guidelines on
enforcement. It suggests that the existing options for enforcement are
inappropriate for international cultural property disputes. Although cultural
property law perhaps rightly focuses on dispute prevention, it must also provide
an enforcement mechanism for international "conflicts of culture" litigation.37
Until then, parties in cultural property disputes should rely on an impartial,
nonbinding recommendation before litigation.
This Comment explores the difficulty of enforcement in cultural property
disputes. Part I argues that the very qualities that classify property as "cultural
property" serve as obstacles to enforcement. And often, as in Chabad,
performance itself carries cultural resonances. Cultural property laws, both
domestically and internationally, do not properly account for the hurdles in
conflicts of culture disputes. Part II contends that enforcement under the FSIA
brings its own set of distinct challenges. The Act's enforcement model,
moreover, breaks down further in the cultural property context. Last, this
32. Boehm, supra note 26.
33. See Salazar & Herschaft, supra note 24.
34. Plaintiffs Motion for Entry of an Order Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1610(c) To Permit
Attachment and Execution the Default Judgment at 7, Agudas Chasidei Chabad of United States v. Russ.
Fed'n, No. 1:05-CV-01548-RCL (D.D.C. Apr. 4,2011).
35. Plaintiffs Second Request To Temporarily Hold in Abeyance Contempt Sanctions and
Enforcement of the Judgment, Agudas Chasidei Chabad of United States v. Russ. Fed'n, No. 1:05-CV-
01548-RCL (D.D.C. Dec. 16, 2011).
36. See Joseph P. Fishman, Locating the International Interest in Intranational Cultural
Property Disputes, 35 YALE J. INT'L L. 347, 382-99 (2010) (proposing an abuse of cultural property
rights standard after the Chabad case); cf Eric A. Posner, The International Protection of Cultural
Property: Some Skeptical Observations, 8 CHI. J. INT'L L. 213, 214 (2007) (identifying the gaps in
cultural property law but arguing that "[t]here is no good argument for international legal regulation of
cultural property .... ).
37. Chabad's unrelenting effort to recover the Schneerson Collection shows the high value that
the group placed on these manuscripts as integral to the religious organization's cultural history.
Russia's takings themselves constitute a key part of their cultural history, first with the Bolshevik
nationalization and then with the gathering of trophies of war. Those two clashing cultural heritages
underscore the struggle for enforcement in Chabad decades later.
38. See 28 U.S.C. § 1602. The statute outlines the exceptions to foreign immunity, the
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Comment underscores the need for an international mechanism capable of
addressing those enforcement problems. International cultural property disputes
such as Chabad have consequences beyond disputed property. Chabad
instigated a cultural standoff between the United States and Russia, which has
strained diplomatic relations, pitting state officials and cultural institutions
against one another. It has also limited the international exchange of cultural
property and in turn decreased the public's access to those cultural goods.
As Chabad illustrates, cultural property is not above the law-it is subject
to many of the same rules and regulations governing other kinds of property.
But addressing international cultural property disputes like any other right of
action under the FSIA will not motivate enforcement. Without a forceful
international treaty addressing those issues, perhaps independent arbitration as
a precursor to litigation could help curb some of these issues. Then, both parties
in the dispute might exhaust fact-finding and argumentation and receive an
impartial, preliminary judgment that could provide guidance on how to
approach international litigation if necessary. Without enforcement
mechanisms built into cultural property law, the struggles in Chabad will
doubtless repeat themselves in future cultural property disputes involving
foreign sovereigns.
II. ENFORCEMENT IN CULTURAL PROPERTY DISPUTES
Numerous obstacles may impede the successful enforcement of a
judgment in a cultural property dispute. First, all cultural property suits
inherently seek "specific performance" decrees. Enforcement through specific
performance is logistically difficult in any dispute, but cultural property
judgments are even more problematic: the property at issue carries deep
emotional, historical, and cultural significance, and those qualities serve as
obstacles to enforcement. How the cultural property dispute is manifested-
whether through bilateral agreement, arbitration, or litigation, for example-
can largely determine the difficulty of future enforcement. When two high-
profile parties fall into an ownership dispute, their willingness to cooperate in
order to avoid a public relations battle will affect their willingness to perform a
decree or uphold an agreement.
Chabad illustrates that performance itself can sometimes carry deep
cultural implications for the losing party. Those effects may be just as powerful
as those on the winning side: for Chabad, repatriation of cultural property, and
for Russia, the cultural heritage of the Russian Revolution and the trophies of
the war campaign. Cultural property laws, both domestically and
internationally, do not offer a mechanism for judicial enforcement in such
situations in which a foreign sovereign is not immune to U.S. jurisdiction.
39. Some commentators, however, argue that cultural property should, at least in some cases,
be exempt from some of the central tenets of the law. See, e.g., Paula A. Franzese, "Georgia on My
Mind"-Reflections on O'Keeffe v. Snyder, 19 SETON HALL L. REV. 1 (1989); Steven A. Bibas, Note,
The Case Against Statutes of Limitations for Stolen Art, 103 YALE L.J. 2437 (1994); Stephanie Cuba,
Note, Stop the Clock: The Case to Suspend the Statute of Limitations on Claims for Nazi-Looted Art, 17




A. Cultural Property Judgments as Specific Performance Decrees
Specific performance, an equitable remedy, is largely discretionary.40 If a
court deems monetary damages inadequate, it may grant specific performance.
Whether specific performance is or is not an appropriate remedy depends on
the "uniqueness" of the property at issue. If the contracted-for goods are, for
example, "unique," a court may decree specific performance." Cultural
property does not simply satisfy that uniqueness test; it is defined by it. Specific
performance "provides compensation that necessarily includes a party's
subjective valuations of property," and cultural property in many ways acquires
its special status because members of a group value that property more than
others value it.4 2 The subjective value characterization of specific performance
captures both the personhood understanding of property and nationhood
understanding of cultural property. 43
A court certainly has leverage to encourage performance of such decrees.
A court may hold the nonperformer in contempt of court; it may even punish
the nonperforming party by assigning jail time or a civil fine. Despite the threat
of those punishments, however, courts still encounter obstacles when enforcing
specific performance decrees. One reason for the difficulty is that specific
performance is an extremely intrusive remedy, through which the state orders
an actor to carry out some action.44 That process-in essence, threatening to jail
or fine someone for not undertaking a specified act that enriches another-
violates social norms about "the appropriate use of the state's monopoly on
force."4A Second, the risk of error in determining whether a specific
performance decree has been satisfied is much higher than in discerning
whether damages have been paid. After all, "the threat of jail or a fine always
stands behind a decree of specific performance."" That fact inherently
complicates enforcement of specific performance decrees, as it moves a civil
award closer to a criminal punishment. Moreover, in disputes with a foreign
party, especially a foreign sovereign, the court's leverage is less effective.47
If specific performance decrees already challenge enforcement, then
40. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 357 (1981) ("[S]pecific performance of a
contract duty will be granted in the discretion of the court .. ").
41. U.C.C. §2-716 (2011).
42. Jason S. Kirwan, Appraising a Presumption: A Modern Look at the Doctrine of Specific
Performance in Real Estate Contracts, 47 WM. & MARY L. REv. 697, 699 (2005) (citing Peter Linzer,
On the Amorality of Contract Remedies-Efficiency, Equity, and the Second Restatement, 81 COLUM, L.
REV. 111, 116-17 (1981)).
43. See supra note 2-3.
44. Melvin A. Eisenberg, Actual and Virtual Specific Performance, the Theory of Efficient
Breach, and the Indifference Principle in Contract Law, 93 CALIF. L. REv. 975, 1020 (2005).
45. Id. (discussing the intrusiveness of the specific performance remedy); see also Max
Weber, The Profession and Vocation ofPolitics (1919), reprinted in WEBER: POLITICAL WRITINGS 309,
316 (Peter Lassman & Ronald Speirs eds., 1994) ("[T]he modem state is an institutional association of
rule . .. which has successfully established the monopoly of physical violence as a means of rule within
a territory. . . .").
46. Eisenberg, supra note 44, at 1021.
47. See infra Section II.B.
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cultural property specific performance decrees present an added layer of
difficulty: the defining quality of cultural property-subjective valuation based
on deep cultural, ethnic, or historical identification48-renders enforcement
even more problematic. The losing party, for example, may subjectively value
keeping the cultural property (i.e., nonperformance) over returning it (i.e.,
complying with the specific performance decree), despite the possible legal
ramifications in that calculus.49
In Chabad, all of those obstacles to enforcement feature in the post-
litigation conflict. Yet Chabad features other unique challenges as well. The
court established jurisdiction over Russia, but Russia has refused to recognize
that determination-a move that, regardless of its legal merits, further
emphasizes the U.S. court's powerlessness to enforce its decisions in Russia.
Russia may value nonperformance itself for reasons other than the cultural
qualities of owning the Collection.50 Cultural property judgments amplify the
difficulties already present in specific performance decrees. The uniqueness of
cultural property distinguishes cultural property disputes from other kinds of
litigation that also seek specific performance.
B. Resolution Methods for Cultural Property Disputes: Agreements,
Arbitration, and Litigation
The method of resolution chosen for resolving a cultural property
dispute-ranging from a bilateral agreement to arbitration and litigation-often
influences the difficulty of subsequent enforcement.
Two parties who are willing to compromise can draft a bilateral
agreement. One of the most successful bilateral agreements has been the import
restriction on Italian archaeological material between the United States and
Italy. In 2001, the two countries signed a bilateral agreement that created
import restrictions on antiquities from Italy.51 The Department of Homeland
Security, in cooperation with museums and cultural institutions, enforces those
import restrictions. Throughout the last decade, the United States has returned
more than 120 objects from public and private collections, most notably the
Princeton University Art Museum and the Met.5 2 The agreement was renewed
in 2006 5 and again in 2011; that most recent iteration created a new
subcategory for specific coins.5 4 But the agreement allows some flexibility for
48. See supra notes 1-2.
49. This dynamic might exist for certain monetary damages, as well. If the damages are high
enough, nonpayment might be worth the possible legal ramifications. But the real special characteristics
of cultural property complicate that determination.
50. See infra Section II.C.
51. 19 C.F.R. § 12.104(g)(a) (2010).
52. Looting Matters: US Extends Agreement with Italy over Antiquities, PR NEWSWIRE (Jan.
21, 2011), http://www.pmewswire.com/news-releases/looting-matters-us-extends-agreement-with-italy-
over-antiquities-I 14366669.html.
53. Extension of import Restrictions Imposed on Archaeological Material Originating in Italy
and Representing the Pre-Classical, Classical, and Imperial Roman Periods, 71 Fed. Reg. 3000 (Jan. 19,
2006), amending 19 C.F.R. § 12.104g(a).
54. Extension of Import Restrictions Imposed on Archaeological Material Originating in Italy
and Representing the Pre-Classical, Classical, and Imperial Roman Periods, 76 Fed. Reg. 3012 (Jan. 19,
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rotation and lending between Italy and the institutions that lost antiquities.55
That model allows for a compromise with low risk of enforcement difficulties
since both parties were willing to initiate a bargain in the first place.
When the two parties disagree and fail to reach an agreement, arbitration
provides a seemingly ideal alternative for resolving their cultural property
dispute. Given the tense nature of such disputes, arbitration offers a relatively
informal route, with "the procedures of the decision-making process . . . shaped
by the parties to fit their needs."56 Arbitration thus allows the parties to limit
the amount of time and money they spend on resolving the dispute. Moreover,
with the sensitive quality of cultural property disputes, arbitration offers the
advantages of privacy and confidentiality, without upsetting any art markets.57
Indeed, the UNIDROIT58 Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural
Objects provides that "[t]he parties may agree to submit the dispute to any
court or other competent authority or to arbitration," as a way of avoiding
potential conflicts of law. 59 Those distinct attributes of arbitration can aid in
enforcement.
Arbitration, however, is not the only way to secure a successful resolution
in a cultural property dispute. Although advocates for the use of arbitration in
cultural property disputes claim that liti ation is "a most costly and destructive
way to deal with [art-related] disputes," a litigation can, in some cases, provide
an effective, enforceable specific performance remedy. With public oversight
of litigation, too, nonperformance can ignite media frenzy. That factor can
pressure the losing party to perform. Although the challenges of specific
performance will always be present, litigation of cultural property will not pose
a substantially greater challenge than litigation of any other kind of property; in
most circumstances, the underlying legal system will enforce the specific
performance decree. Enforcing a specific performance decree in litigation
becomes more challenging, however, when the suit is international-when
existing conflicts of law and jurisdiction issues are more likely to complicate
the cultural property dispute.
2011).
55. Id.
56. Daniel Shapiro, Litigation and Art-Related Disputes, in RESOLUTION METHODS FOR ART-
RELATED DISPUTES 17, 29 (1999).
57. Id. at 30; accord ISABELLE FELLRATH GAZZINNI, CULTURAL PROPERTY DISPUTES: THE
ROLE OF ARBITRATION IN RESOLVING NON-CONTRACTUAL DISPUTES 67 (2004). But cf JUDITH RESNIK
& DENNIS CURTIS, REPRESENTING JUSTICE: INVENTION, CONTROVERSY, AND RIGHTS IN CITY-STATES
AND DEMOCRATIC COURTROOMS (2011) (arguing that the long history of justice iconography embodies
the democratic process of adjudication in the open, accessible courtroom).
58. The International Institute for the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT) is "an
independent intergovernmental Organisation . . . . Its purpose is to study needs and methods for
modernising, harmonising and co-ordinating private and in particular commercial law as between States
and groups of States and to formulate uniform law instruments, principles and rules to achieve those
objectives." UNIDROIT, http://www.unidroit.org/dynasite.cfm?dsmid=103284 (last visited Apr. 2,
2012).
59. UNIDROIT Convention, supra note 5, ch. IV, art. 8, § 2.
60. Shapiro, supra note 56, at 17.
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C. Challenges to Enforcement in Chabad
The circumstances of Chabad reveal enforcement difficulties beyond the
typical challenges characteristic of specific performance suits. First, Chabad
presents a disconnect between the actors in the lawsuit and the trend toward
repatriation in cultural property disputes. John Henry Merryman has
characterized cultural property disputes as a struggle between two camps:
cultural property as "components of a common human culture," or,
alternatively, as "part of a national cultural heritage."6' Cultural property
disputes, in legal practice and academic discourse, balance Merryman's two
ways of viewing cultural property against each other. But as resource-rich
"source nations" began aggressively passing ownership statutes and export
restrictions to recover looted artworks, the tide has shifted toward nationalism.
And the willingness of importing countries to enforce those foreign ownership
statutes in their own courts has greatly facilitated source nations' repatriation
claims. 62
But Chabad provides a case that both conflates Merryman's two models
and challenges the trend toward repatriation. In Chabad, repatriation (giving
the Collection to Chabad) is also internationalist (spreading resources beyond
the borders of the source nation). Thus, the standard model of the cultural
property dispute no longer applies. Usually, a foreign party from a resource-
rich nation brings a suit to recover property in a resource-poor nation, where
the cultural property has been bought through the black market. In the recent
trend toward repatriation, the resource-poor nation applies the new, strict
cultural property ownership laws of the resource-rich nation, and repatriation
usually follows. That structure does not follow in Chabad. Instead, the foreign
party (i.e., Russia, the source nation) possesses the cultural property and is
forced into litigation in the resource-poor nation, which asserts ownership of
the cultural property. Russia's 1919 and 1920 nationalization statutes,
moreover, act as the traditional ownership statutes, but, in this case, they pose
hindrances to repatriation, unlike in most cultural property cases. That odd
mismatch of traditional motivations in Chabad led to the application of the
FSIA in a cultural property dispute.
Second, Chabad presents unique "conflicts of culture," a fact that
underscores the difficulty of enforcement. Enforcement has proved especially
61. John Henry Merryman, Two Ways of Thinking About Cultural Property, 80 AM. J. INT'L L.
831, 831-32 (1986).
62. See Andrea Cunning, U.S. Policy on the Enforcement of Foreign Export Restrictions on
Cultural Property & Destructive Aspects of Retention Schemes, 26 Hous. J. INT'L L. 449, 500 (2004);
Jordana Hughes, Note, The Trend Toward Liberal Enforcement of Repatriation Claims in Cultural
Property Disputes, 33 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REv. 131, 133 (2000) (citing Michael J. Kelly, Conflicting
Trends in the Flourishing International Trade of Art and Antiquities: Restitutio in Integrum and
Possessio animo Ferundi/Lucrandi, 14 DICK. J. INT'L L. 31, 54 (1995)); see also Jonathan S. Moore,
Enforcing Foreign Ownership Claims in the Antiquities Market, 97 YALE L.J. 466, 470-71 (1988)
(arguing that the repatriation trend and deference to foreign ownership statutes have meant that many
objects that were purchased in good faith are considered legally stolen objects based on the export laws
of source nations). But see Graham Green, Note, Evaluating the Application of the National Stolen
Property Act to Art Trafficking Cases, 44 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 251, 255-56 (2007) (arguing that the
internationalist perspective aids the preservation of cultural property).
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challenging in this case because Russia's fulfillment of the specific performance
decree would, in a way, suggest a betrayal of its own cultural heritage. If
Russia returns the Library, it undermines the legality of takings during
nationalization in the Soviet Union.6 3 If Russia returns the Archive, it
undermines its legal claim to all the cultural treasures it acquired during the
Soviet "retrieval" of Nazi loot, jeopardizing a significant portion of its holdings
in museums and cultural institutions." Meanwhile, if Russia retains the
Schneerson Collection, then Chabad remains without a central piece of its
cultural heritage. That tension between two cultural heritages further
complicates the Cultural property aspect of Chabad.65 There is no international
mechanism to resolve such "conflicts of culture" that can emerge in cultural
property disputes. Chabad represents a cultural cold war not only because of
the standoff between American and Russian museums, but also because there
will be a forfeiture of cultural heritage regardless of whether Russia performs.
In sum, existing cultural property laws and regulations are largely
preventative. They focus on the important question of how to curb the looting
and sale of antiquities but lack legal guidelines on adjudicating cultural
property disputes. 6 6 Chabad illustrates that, given those added complications to
enforcement, domestic and international cultural property laws need to offer
clear procedures for judicial enforcement of cultural property dispute
resolutions.
III. ENFORCEMENT UNDER THE FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT
This Part discusses the difficulty of enforcement inherent to suits brought
under the FSIA. The Act focuses on jurisdiction and exceptions: when suits are
brought under one of the Act's exceptions to foreign immunity, certain
requirements must be met in order to establish jurisdiction over the foreign
state. In any suit brought under the FSIA that successfully establishes
jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign, the court will have difficulty enforcing an
63. GRIMSTED, supra note 12, at 288-89.
64. Id.
65. The closest scenario in art law is the famously unresolved conflict between the United
Kingdom and Greece over the Elgin Marbles. In the early nineteenth century, Thomas Bruce, Earl of
Elgin and the British Ambassador to the Ottoman Empire, obtained a permit from the Ottoman
government to remove a section of the Acropolis. Over ten years, Elgin's team removed the marbles-
which included the Parthenon's sculptures and portions of the structure-and transported them to
England. For more than two centuries, a public debate has raged about the true ownership of the
Parthenon Marbles, now known as the Elgin Marbles. The protracted and unresolved dispute between
England and Greece over the Elgin Marbles is the paradigmatic conflicts of culture case in cultural
property. See generally JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, THINKING ABOUT THE ELGIN MARBLES: CRITICAL
ESSAYS ON CULTURAL PROPERTY, ART AND LAW (2d ed. 2009) (reexamining the Greek and British
claims to the Elgin Marbles).
66. UNESCO and UNIDROIT scholarship has noted deficiencies in enforcement mechanisms.
See PATRICK J. O'KEEFE, COMMENTARY ON THE UNESCO 1970 CONVENTION ON ILLICIT TRAFFIC 117-
20 (2000); John B. Gordon, Comment, The UNESCO Convention on the Illicit Movement of Art
Treasures, 12 HARV. INT'L. L.J. 537, 554 (1971); Hughes, supra note 62, at 136-37; Nina R. Lenzner,
Note, The Illicit International Trade in Cultural Property: Does the UNIDROIT Convention Provide an
Effective Remedy for the Shortcomings of the UNESCO Convention?, 15 U. PA. J. INT'L BUS. L. 469,
478-79, 494 n.124 (1994); David A. Meyer, Note, The 1954 Hague Cultural Property Convention and
Its Emergence into Customary International Law, 11 B.U. INT'L L.J. 349, 357-58 (1993).
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unfavorable judgment simply as a result of its lack of a compelling enforcement
power. That enforcement model splinters further in the context of cultural
property disputes.
A. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
67The FSIA became law on October 21, 1976. The purpose of the Act was
to define jurisdiction in disputes involving foreign sovereigns and, especially,
"[t]o define . .. the circumstances in which foreign states are immune from suit
and in which execution may not be levied on their property, and for other
purposes."6 The statute came as a reaction against complete deference to the
sovereign immunity doctrine, in which U.S. courts had had to dismiss cases
against foreign states when they pled sovereign immunity. The State
Department's famous "Tate Letter" in 1952 first brought the problem of
absolute sovereign immunity to light: with every dismissed plea also came a
citizen who was denied access to litigation. 70 As courts over the next two
decades gradually moved away from absolute sovereign immunity, they
granted sovereign immunity unevenly, and the FSIA sought to eliminate those
inconsistent applications.7' Accordingly, the FSIA represents "a substantial
contribution to the harmonization of international sovereign immunity law." 72
Given that history, the statute itself is consciously structured to favor
foreign sovereigns. It assumes that foreign states are immune from the
jurisdiction of U.S. courts. The law specifies that baseline assumption directly
and also suggests its benefit: the assumption "serve[s] the interests of justice
and would protect the rights of both foreign states and litigants in United States
courts."73 That restrictive principle was consistent with the prevailing view on
sovereign immunity in international law as well.74
The statute goes on to stipulate the situations in which a foreign sovereign
is not immune from U.S. jurisdiction. Exceptions occur when, for example, the
foreign state actor (1) has waived its immunity, explicitly or implicitly; (2) has
conducted commercial activity in the United States; (3) has taken property in
violation of international law, and that property is connected to the commercial
activity; (4) is situated in the United States; or (5) may be potentially liable for
a tortious act or omission occurring in the United States.75
67. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA), Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602-1611 (2006)).
68. Id. § 1330.
69. See The Schooner Exchange v. McFadden, II U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812) (Marshall, C.J.)
(holding that a foreign sovereign's armed public vessels had absolute immunity from jurisdiction); see
also Republic of Mex. v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 35 (1945) ("It is ... not for the courts to deny an
immunity").
70. Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep't of State, to Philip B. Perlman,
Acting Att'y Gen. (May 19, 1952), reprinted in 26 DEP'T ST. BULL. 984 (1952).
71. Jeffrey N. Martin, Note, Sovereign Immunity: Limits ofJudicial Control, 18 HARV. INT'L
L.J. 429,436 (1977).
72. Id. at 456.
73. 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (2006).
74. European Convention on State Immunity, May 16, 1972, 11 I.L.M. 470 (1972).
75. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1)-(5).
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The exception at issue in Chabad is the commercial activity exception to
foreign immunity from U.S. jurisdiction. The Act defines "commercial
activity" as "either a regular course of commercial conduct or a particular
commercial transaction or act."77 The standard for determining commercial
conduct is not by reference to its purpose, but rather "by reference to the nature
of the course of conduct or particular transaction or act." 78
The commercial activity prong of the FSIA has a parallel in international
law.79 However, although the Russian Federation and the United States are
parties to the Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and
Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters,8 0 Russia does not
currently recognize this treaty relationship with the United States. In July 2003,
Russia unilaterally suspended all judicial cooperation with the United States in
civil and commercial matters.8 1
B. Enforcement Under the FSIA
There are difficulties inherent in compelling a foreign sovereign to
perform. The FSIA grounds its jurisdictional claims in international law, stating
that "[u]nder international law, states are not immune from the jurisdiction of
foreign courts insofar as their commercial activities are concerned." 8 2 But the
lack of forceful police power undermines the ability of a U.S. court to enforce a
judgment against a foreign sovereign.
Parties are not entirely powerless, however. They may attempt to enforce
judgments against a foreign sovereign by attaching other assets held in the
United States.8 3 Whether property is "commercial" is important in two different
respects for execution against foreign states. First, if the property is "used for a
commercial activity in the United States," it is not immune from attachment
under some circumstances.84 Second, one of the additional specific exceptions
from immunity required for execution is whether "the property is or was used
for the commercial activity on which the claim is based."85 For commercial
disputes, attaching financial assets is an appropriate, and often effective,
solution.
76. Id. § 1605(a)(2) (2006).
77. Id. § 1603(d).
78. Id.
79. Id. § 1602.
80. Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or
Commercial Matters, Nov. 15, 1965, 20 U.S.T. 361, 658 U.N.T.S. 163; see also Status of the Convention
on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters,
UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/showDetails.aspx?objid=
08000002801258ac (last visited Apr. 15, 2012) (listing both the United States and the Russian
Federation as parties to the Convention).
81. See Russia Judicial Assistance, U.S. DEP'T OF ST., http://travel.state.gov/law/judicial/
judicial 383 .html (last visited Mar. 26, 2012) (discussing judicial assistance between the United States
and Russia).
82. 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (2006).
83. See id. § 1610(a).
84. Id.
85. Id. § 1610(a)(2).
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C. Challenges to Enforcement Under the FSIA in Chabad
After the D.C. Circuit made its ruling in Chabad, Russia's Ministry of
Culture released a statement on its website denying the legality of U.S.
jurisdiction. "Unfortunately," the statement read, "the U.S. judge made an
unlawful decision, which cannot be enforced in Russia, as a matter of fact.
There is no agreement between Russia and the U.S. on mutual recognition and
enforcement of civil judgments."86  The timing of Russia's statement
questioning the legitimacy of U.S. jurisdiction seemed odd. If a foreign
sovereign does not believe that another country has jurisdiction, it can simply
not engage in the legal battle at all. Russia's participation in the legal
proceedings for years (after losing a motion to dismiss Chabad's claims on
grounds of lack of jurisdiction in 2005) acts as an implicit waiver of
immunity.
In April 2011, Chabad filed a motion to permit attachment and execution
on the default judgment.88 Although assets are often attached to enforce FSIA
judgments, given the special nature of the disputed cultural property in Chabad,
to attach financial assets seems somewhat arbitrary and ineffective in
motivating Russia's performance. As Part II discussed, any cultural property
suit rewards specific performance in a judgment for the plaintiff. But
sometimes even the performance itself carries unique, subjective value.
Margaret Jane Radin writes that, for some property, perhaps no value can be
objectively ascribed. Valuation, she argues, depends on the owner's
relationship to the property.89 Depending on how strongly each side
subjectively values the cultural property, attaching financial assets could be
ineffective if the assets' valuation is less than that of the cultural property.
Perhaps realizing that risk, Chabad's lawyers threatened that the assets
they planned to attach were Russian artworks on loan in the United States.
Although Chabad's lawyers denied that they ever intended that attachment, in
theory it logically follows from the attachment process in many FSIA judgment
enforcement strategies: attaching cultural property in cultural property disputes
is analogous to attaching financial assets held in the United States in
commercial disputes. In this case, the Russian Federation has not returned the
Schneerson Collection to Chabad. Chabad's lawyers, in turn, threatened to hold
loaned Russian artworks hostage until Russia fulfills the judgment. That threat,
of course, had a weak legal basis. The FSIA acknowledges that the ability to
attach property is not absolute. If property is "entitled to enjoy the privileges,
exemptions, and immunities provided by the International Organizations
86. See Russia Won't Give Schneerson Library to American Hasids, supra note 18.
87. See Plaintiffs Motion for Civil Contempt Sanctions Against Defendants Russian
Federation, Russian Ministry of Culture and Mass Communication, Russian State Library, and Russian
State Military Archive at 3 & n.2, 14, Agudas Chasidei Chabad of U.S. v. Russ. Fed'n, No. 1:05-CV-
01548-RCL (D.D.C. Apr. 4, 2011) (No. 92).
88. Plaintiffs Motion for Entry of an Order Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1610(c) To Permit
Attachment and Execution on the Default Judgment, Agudas Chasidei Chabad of the U.S. v. Russ.
Fed'n, 528 F.3d 934 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (No. 91).
89. See Radin, supra note 3, at 959.
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Immunities Act," then it is not available for attachment.90 Works of art,
moreover, are independently protected; they are immune from seizure while on
loan in the United States.91
Although Chabad's threat to seize Russian artworks on loan in the United
States was weak from a legal perspective, it nevertheless had very concrete
repercussions. First, it prompted Russia to retain all the art it had planned to
loan to U.S. museum exhibits, as well as to revoke artworks already loaned to
one museum.92 Second, diplomatic relations between Russia and the United
States have frayed. With the cultural feud simmering, the State Department
initially only became involved in a diplomatic capacity, in hopes of quelling the
tensions between the two nations. As tensions between the two sides failed to
subside, in 2011 the United States became an interested party in the lawsuit.9 3
The FSIA offers a method for litigants in the United States to establish
jurisdiction in foreign conflicts. It defines situations in which those actions are
legitimate, such as the foreign sovereign's commercial activity in the United
States. The FSIA, then, served its purpose in Chabad in establishing U.S.
federal jurisdiction over Russia's commercial activity with archival material in
the United States. The purpose of the FSIA, however, is inconsistent with the
structure of cultural property litigation. Although the FSIA was useful in
Chabad in establishing jurisdiction, the problem of enforcement stubbornly
remains.
IV. CONCLUSION
Chabad-its troubled history, failed diplomacy, and fruitless litigation-
highlights a problem in cultural property law. In particular, it exemplifies a
complex cultural property suit without a cause of action in cultural property
law. Because of that dissonance, an inappropriate enforcement mechanism was
employed, resulting in a stagnant legal result, with detrimental political,
cultural, and economic consequences.
As a cultural property dispute, Chabad illustrates the natural challenges
of specific performance enhanced by the presence of cultural property. The
structure of the lawsuit in Chabad adds to the challenges presented by the two
litigious, international parties, and the more troubling "conflicts of culture"
problem. Applying the FSIA to the dispute, moreover, enabled the U.S. federal
court system to gain jurisdiction over Russia. But that move, in turn, led to
canceled loan agreements, revoked artworks, and strained diplomacy between
the United States and the Russian Federation. The net effect has been to limit
the international free flow of cultural property and to decrease the public's
access to that cultural property.
Both of those problems originate from the fact that existing cultural
90. 28 U.S.C. § 1611(a) (2006).
91. See supra note 25-31.
92. See supra notes 24-35 and accompanying text.
93. Supplemental Notice by United States of Potential Participation, Chabad, 528 F.3d 934
(No. 95).
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property protections are largely preventative. They admirably focus on
preventing cultural property disputes from arising, providing mechanisms to
curb the looting and trafficking of cultural property. But those measures do not
address how to resolve the conflicts that do arise. That is why enforcement
seems possible only when the two parties are willing participants. Using the
FSIA in Chabad's case, or the National Stolen Property Act94 more commonly,
are ways that parties in cultural property disputes mobilize existing domestic
laws for a different purpose. 95 But that pragmatic choice leads to enforcement
difficulties later.
As Chabad illustrates, blindly addressing international cultural property
disputes under the commercial prong of the FSIA will not ensure enforcement.
Cultural property law needs an international mechanism that directly addresses
enforcement. Without such an enforcement mechanism built into international
law, future cultural property disputes involving foreign sovereigns would stand
to benefit from internationally required, nonbinding, independent arbitration.
Then, perhaps, both parties to the dispute would exhaust fact-finding and
argumentation and receive an impartial, preliminary judgment or
recommendation for how to draft an agreement. With that recommendation,
parties would be better advised on how to proceed in their dispute. It is possible
that the parties would choose to limit the costs of protracted litigation and draft
an agreement, according to the recommendation. If the parties choose to
proceed in international litigation, then the preliminary judgment could inform
future strategy. Regardless, the Chabad case reveals both the strength and
limitation of the legal protections of cultural property: those protections require
an enforcement mechanism tailored to the unique challenges of cultural
property disputes.
94. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2311-2318 (2006).
95. Using the FSIA as the enforcement instrument in Chabad has ultimately undermined U.S.
policy goals of protecting and increasing access to cultural property. That outcome is analogous to what
Stephen Urice describes as the problem with using the National Stolen Property Act in antiquities
disputes. See Stephen K. Urice, Between Rocks and Hard Places: Unprovenanced Antiquities and the
National Stolen Property Act, 40 N.M. L REv. 123, 124 (2010) (describing "the general inadequacy of
the NSPA" to respond to unprovenanced antiquities disputes and arguing that its "continued
application . .. in cases involving unprovenanced antiquities risks outcomes that undermine one or both
of two U.S. policy goals: (1) protecting the global archaeological record and (2) promoting museums'
charitable and educational missions"); see also Green, supra note 62, at 263 (arguing that courts should
bring their application of the National Stolen Property Act in line with cultural internationalism instead
of deferring to cultural nationalism).
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